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Abstract
Despite several decades of research on governance, very little is known about pro-
cesses and practices of governing and, crucially, the links between governing and 
organisational performance. This has led to calls to penetrate the ‘black box’ of the 
boardroom by conducting research which draws on data gathered through direct 
observation. Such calls, however, have so far produced a rather sparse and incho-
ate literature which would benefit from review in order to give shape to the field 
and provide direction for future research. Here, we critically examine the findings of 
this research, focusing on three emergent themes: (1) the extent to which empirical 
research supports the established theories in the field, particularly agency and stew-
ardship theories; (2) what research says about ‘good’ and ‘effective’ governance and 
the relationship between them; and (3) the methodological and conceptual orienta-
tions which frame this research, and  the claims made for ‘processual’ approaches. 
We conclude with an agenda for taking the field forward in order to extend knowl-
edge and to contribute to theory around governing.
Keywords Control-collaboration paradox · Effective governance · Good 
governance · Processual research · Symbolic governance · Strategising
1 Introduction
The importance attached to the role of the governing board is reflected in the 
widespread introduction of codes of good governance in both the for-profit and 
not-for-profit sectors. Good governance is, however, ‘a rare and unnatural act’ 
(Taylor et al. 1996) and governing boards have been subject to criticism and cen-
sure with many examples of mismanagement attributed to the failure of govern-
ing boards to effectively oversee organisations or provide strategic direction. This 
apparent failure is compounded by a lack of understanding, among academics, 
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organisations and boards alike, of what governing ‘is’ or the practices that attend 
it (Hill et al. 2016). Despite the normative assumptions underpinning the work of 
governing boards there is little empirical evidence which has examined what it is 
boards actually do. Research has focused on structures and procedures in terms 
of the formal constitution of entities providing accountability mechanisms (Boyd 
et al. 2011), with little known about the processes and practices of governing or 
relationships between governance, leadership and organisational aims/outcomes. 
Much of this research has been conducted within a positivist ethos in search of a 
‘global theory’ which eschews fine-grained analysis and ignores the role of con-
text and wider relations of the board (Durisin and Povone 2009). While McNulty 
et al. (2013, p. 183) point to a growth of qualitative studies with greater concern 
around the performance of boards and critique of dominant theories, particularly 
agency theory, they note that this still represents only a small fraction of pub-
lished work. Though yielding some interesting insights into board behaviours and 
dynamics, much of this qualitative research has been conducted within an inter-
pretive tradition focusing on the perspectives and experiences of board members, 
relying on participants’ retrospective accounts gathered through semi-structured 
interviews. While helpful for understanding individuals’ sense-making and iden-
tities in relation to governance, such studies do not capture the complexity of 
strategic decision-making in real time as it unfolds in meetings. In acknowledging 
this deficit, Cadbury (2000, p. 12) argued that,
The most useful field for further research would be into what goes on in 
boards … The more that research can concentrate on boards in action, on 
process rather than structure, the greater the chance that research findings 
will be operationally relevant and acted upon.
Since Cadbury wrote this, a growing number of researchers have taken up the 
call to study boards in action. This paper presents a review of this research to 
uncover what it is that boards ‘really’ do. Its aim is to interrogate the field, pro-
viding a critical review and analysis of the various streams of research that have 
employed observational methods to study boards. The paper will be of use to aca-
demics conducting research in this and cognate areas. In this way we aim to sup-
port a research programme which will yield knowledge of use to boards, leader-
ship and management, and policy-makers.
In doing this we identify three important themes emerging from the literature: 
(1) the extent to which empirical research supports the established theories in the 
field, particularly agency and stewardship theories; (2) what research says about 
‘good’ and ‘effective’ governance and the relationship between them; and (3) the 
methodological and conceptual orientations which frame this research, in particu-
lar the claims made for ‘processual’ approaches.
The paper is set out as follows: we start by defining the scope of our review, in 
which we consider corporate governance in both the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors. We follow this with an overview of research in the field and present a 
critical analysis in relation to the three themes outlined above. Finally, we sum-
marise the findings and we conclude with an agenda to take the field forward.
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2  Defining the scope of the research
While acknowledging the wider governance space within which organisations oper-
ate, this paper focuses on the key role of the board meeting in representing the formal 
route through which the organisation is constituted. As Samra-Fredericks (2000a, p. 
251) notes, while much talk of relevance to board decisions occurs outside the board-
room ‘in corridors, car parks, personal offices and the men’s toilets’, if it is significant 
it finds its way to the boardroom as this is the space in which  governing is legitimised. 
We have included research covering both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, not 
for the purposes of comparison but in order to enlarge the pool of research from which 
to draw, as access to boardrooms, particularly of for-profit organisations, has proved 
difficult for a number of reasons (Leblanc and Schwartz 2007). As a rule of thumb, for-
profits have shareholders, not-for-profits have (only) stakeholders. While we recognise 
that this difference has considerable implications for the governing board in relation to 
revenue sources, organisational values/mission and in terms of accountability, which 
might indeed have significant effects on the processes and practices of governing, in 
other respects, both for- and not-for- profits share common concerns such as strategic 
positioning, ensuring financial probity, planning, control, etc. (Cornforth 2004). More-
over, many of the normative assumptions surrounding not-for-profits (especially around 
charitable status) are unfounded since not-for-profits are very variable and some may 
operate in very competitive markets (Maitlis 2004). Indeed, some commentators note 
a convergence between governance in the for- and not-for- profit sectors as the ‘new 
public management’ has encouraged moves towards the adoption of organisational 
structures that mimic the commercial sector (Ashburner et al. 1996; Peck et al. 2004; 
Freeman and Peck 2007; Tacon and Walters 2016); conversely, for-profit organisations 
are now required to be heedful of their ‘corporate and social responsibilities’ in the pur-
suit of ‘sustainable’ governance (Huse 2005), which acknowledges wider obligations 
towards non-shareholder stakeholders (Bury and Leblanc 2007).
While there are clearly cognate areas of research which are relevant to the work 
of boards (for example, around strategy, decision-making, meetings etc.), the govern-
ing board represents a distinct scenario which justifies it as a focus for research. The 
governing board is a complex social mix, necessitated, according to Berle and Means’ 
(1932) foundational work, as a result of the separation of ownership and control of an 
organisation. External control is presumed to be necessary in order to protect share-
holders’ interests, but ‘outsider’ status renders the function of the board problematic 
since most non-executive directors (NEDs) have limited knowledge of the organisa-
tion, limited time, and quite possibly limited commitment to the enterprise. This sets 
up some distinctive processes around the three areas of strategy, control and support/
service that are widely assumed to form the core areas of board function (Hung 1998; 
Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2001).
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3  Observational research and theories of governing
The distinct and complex nature of the work of the governing board is indicated 
by the range of competing/complementary theories advanced to account for it. 
Key among these are: agency (Eisenhardt 1989; Brennan et al. 2016), stewardship 
(Davis et al. 1997), managerial hegemony (Kosnik 1987), and resource depend-
ency (Bryant and Davis 2012). Others, such as stakeholder theory (e.g., Corn-
forth 2004), certainly have relevance for governing, especially for not-for-profits, 
though they are not specific to it. Since these theories are well-covered in the 
literature we have not elaborated on them here. While it would be tempting to 
align theory with the three core areas, this would be simplistic. However, it might 
be reasonable to say that control is the main focus of agency theory; stewardship 
concerns mainly service/support but may also include a strategy role; managerial 
hegemony assumes board support for managerial decision making; and resource 
dependency is focused on service/support. It should be noted that agency theory 
is regarded as problematic in relation to not-for-profits which may have a number 
of principals with different objectives (Van Puyvelde et al. 2012). While preva-
lent in the literature, theories of governing are underpinned by relatively little 
empirical work. In particular, there is little understanding of the complex interac-
tions severally implied. If control, strategy and support/service are assumed to 
be the key functions of boards then this gives rise to a complex set of potentially 
paradoxical tensions around control and collaboration (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
2003; Smith and Lewis 2011) which have yet to be adequately examined through 
an empirical lens. In addition to these three instrumental aspects of governing, 
others have alluded to the symbolic role of boards in organisations, drawing on 
neo-institutionalism, which holds that symbols are ‘instruments of interpretive 
order’ (March and Olsen 1983, p. 741).
4  Overview of papers selected for review
We have adopted an ‘intelligent’ rather than a systematic approach to searching 
the literature. While it may be argued that a systematic review adds support for 
the genesis of a concept, we agree with Maclure (2005, p. 394) that ‘systematic 
review systematically degrades the central acts of reviewing: namely, reading and 
writing, and the unreliable intellectual acts that these support, such as interpreta-
tion, argument and analysis’. Starting with a few key terms devised independently, 
the first two authors searched ‘Google Scholar’ and key journals in the field, the 
overarching criterion being that papers must have included empirical data gath-
ered by means of observation of boards in session. We expanded our search terms 
as we read, incorporating what emerged as key ideas, and followed the threads 
where they took us. Finally, we compared our lists, noting overlaps and diver-
gence. Though we think it unlikely, we cannot exclude the possibility that some 
papers that would have made the cut have been missed, for which we apologise in 
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advance. The majority of the papers considered for inclusion have been published 
in peer-reviewed journals, but we also looked at conference papers and book 
chapters. Most of the research reported has been carried out since 2000, but we 
also looked at earlier research that we considered to have made a significant con-
tribution. We have been selective in what we present below. In particular, we have 
rigorously excluded papers in which the analysis and discussion does not appear 
to have been informed by the observational data claimed to have been gathered.
While all the research referred to draws on direct observation of board meetings, 
these data range from field notes alone to audio, and, in a few cases, video data. All 
studies have also analysed other data, typically documents and interviews. A number 
of methodological approaches is evident, with most studies described as case stud-
ies or longitudinal case studies. Some have drawn on a mixed methods approach, 
though the majority are entirely qualitative. Most are of not-for-profit organisations, 
perhaps indicative of difficulties of access and a heightened sensitivity to this kind 
of research among for-profit companies. Among not-for-profits a range of settings 
have been studied, including the UK National Health Service (NHS), schools and 
colleges of further education, service/welfare organisations, sports bodies, and pro-
fessional associations. Studies have mainly been conducted by outside researchers 
involving non-participant observation, though a small number of ‘insider’ studies 
are also reported.
Many of the journal articles reporting on direct observation of boards refer to 
the scarcity of this form of data and appeal to the need to ‘open the black box’ of 
governing (Huse and Zattoni 2008; Leblanc and Schwartz 2007; Machold and Far-
quhar 2013; Michaud 2014; Parker 2007, 2008; Pugliese et al. 2015b; and see also 
Huse 2005 and Roberts et  al. 2005). However, little consideration is given to the 
ontological assumptions which attend ‘opening the black box’. Indeed, it is a term 
that obscures as much as it reveals, reinforcing a positivist ideology of observation 
in which consideration of the ethics of representation or a reflexive consideration of 
what is ignored or not disclosed, is rarely encountered. Similarly, many papers refer 
to their work as ‘processual’, though the underlying ontological demands attending 
‘process’ and the implications for understanding governing are rarely addressed.
Table 1 sets out the papers selected for inclusion in this review. The findings are 
presented below in relation to the three themes outlined above: empirical support for 
theories of governing; ‘good’ and ‘effective’ governing; and what is understood by 
‘processual’ research.
5  What support does observational research lend to theory?
In the ‘real’ world of the governing board, support for theory is both limited and 
qualified. ‘Pure’ agency or stewardship relationships are rarely encountered. Most 
observational studies indicate a tendency towards passivity. Typical is Peck’s 
(1995) study of ‘board performance’ in a NHS Trust in the UK. The study was con-
ducted over a period of 18 months during which time 15 meetings were observed. 
Peck’s findings indicate that most time was spent in the dissemination of informa-
tion to NEDs and in approving proposals, leading Peck to conclude that the board 
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was ‘primarily passive’ and not engaged in strategy formation. Board behaviour 
thus contradicted prescriptive norms for corporate boards but is consistent with 
managerial hegemony theory. However, Peck notes too that though little time was 
taken up with challenges to executive directors the impact of this was greater than 
the time they took up (around 5%) might suggest (Peck 1995, p. 153). Similarly, 
Parker (2007, 2008) served on the boards of two Australian not-for-profit organi-
sations (both large professional associations) for a year before embarking on the 
research as a ‘complete member researcher’ over a period of 2 years. Parker notes 
a tendency towards ‘passive acceptance of board committee recommendations’ or 
‘mild questioning’ (Parker 2007, p. 929). In a longitudinal study of the distribution 
of board tasks in six organisations (four not-for-profit, one for-profit and one public), 
Machold and Farquhar (2013) note that ‘routine monitoring’ and ‘passive informa-
tion dissemination’ were the predominant activities—and this was particularly evi-
dent in the for-profit and public companies. However, they also noted that boards 
spent a great deal of time engaged in activities ‘incongruent with current conceptu-
alisations of board tasks’ (p. 161), which mainly concerned information dissemina-
tion around operational issues. Taken together, the findings from these studies do 
not support the normative assumptions underpinning prevalent theories.
The passive/active binary may not, however, be very illuminating and reinforces 
the assumption that passive = bad while active = good. Hendry et al. (2010) propose 
instead that board tasks should be conceptualised as ‘procedural’ (boards moni-
tor and ratify decisions) or ‘interactive’ (the board is involved in strategy forma-
tion). According to this typology, board activity is conceived as a continuum from: 
receiving information, through scrutiny/challenge, to active involvement in strategy 
development—all of which are, to varying degrees and at different times, legitimate 
activities. This is demonstrated in Freeman and Peck’s (2007) study of a NHS Board 
charged with developing strategy around commissioning and provision of health 
care services. Overall, the authors determined that, in relation to agenda items con-
cerned with strategy, the board spent around a quarter of its time in challenge/amend 
mode, consistent with an ‘active scrutiny’ role. Similarly, in an earlier observational 
study of 11 NHS Trust boards undertaken at the time of their inception, Ashburner 
et al. (1996) noted that though these boards engaged in challenge and scrutiny they 
were not involved in the formulation of strategy. There was one exception, however. 
Over the course of a year, one board, established de novo, moved from receiving 
information, through scrutiny/challenge to being fully engaged in strategy devel-
opment as NEDs grew in expertise and managers’ confidence in them developed 
(Ashburner et al. 1996). In this case, the initial task for the board was, as Watson 
and Drew (2017) put it to ‘constitute itself to and for itself’, i.e., to define its role 
and develop membership ties. Only once this was achieved were they able to move 
towards strategy development.
The importance of context was also demonstrated in Huse’s (1998) study 
of three commercial companies in Norway (see also Huse and Zattoni 2008). 
These cases were selected as they represented companies in very different situ-
ations: recovery from bankruptcy (‘Recovery’); undergoing restructuring (‘Reor-
ganising’); and in need of re-financing (‘Refinancing’). Huse, an academic, 
was appointed ‘in the normal way’ as the Chair to these three companies and 
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maintained a journal over a 15-month period as a participant observer. He con-
cluded that the key function of the board varied: for Recovery the main role was 
creating legitimacy (one of the very few studies which relates to resource depend-
ency theory); for Refinancing it was active monitoring of the actions of the man-
ager (agency theory); and in Reorganising the board had a supportive or advisory 
role (consistent with stewardship). Huse and Zattoni (2008) analyse the findings 
of this study in relation to trust and its importance in empowering boards, which 
varied according to the stage in the board ‘life cycle’, and the composition of 
board’s internal/external actors. Thus, a key consideration in assessing board per-
formance is the nature of the dynamic relations which give rise to board learning.
The evolutionary nature of boards also featured in Brannen et al.’s (1976) sem-
inal study of the ‘worker director’ experiment in the British Steel Corporation in 
the 1970s in which workers were appointed to the board. Though they provide 
frustratingly little detail in their report of this research, the authors note that the 
contribution of the worker directors changed over time. Initially restricting their 
input to areas of their own experience, as they developed confidence the worker 
directors ‘were prepared to a greater or lesser extent to talk about almost all items 
which came to the board’ (p. 182). Moreover, Brannen et al. observe that, since 
the worker directors were less knowledgeable about items brought to the board 
than many of the other directors, they had perforce to seek information through 
questioning. This provides support for Brennan et  al.’s (2016) hypothesis that 
contra agency theory, information asymmetry is necessary to the control function 
of boards since this is what produces challenge.
While offering some important insights, the studies cited above are not based 
on video/audio data that could support a more fine-grained analysis of board 
interactional dynamics. One of the few studies which has taken cameras into the 
board room has been undertaken by a team of researchers in Australia. Pugliese 
et al. (2015a, b) and Nicholson et al. (2017) observed board meetings of two not-
for-profit companies, collecting video data over a 6-month period. This involved 
observation of three meetings of each company analysed adopting a mixed 
methods approach including, unusually, a quantitative data set used to establish 
relationships between variables explored in more depth through the qualitative 
data. Pugliese et  al. (2015a, b) examined the ‘inner dynamics’ of board meet-
ings hypothesising a relationship between: time spent discussing agenda items, 
‘director dominance’, and ‘discussion quality’ (as rated by board members imme-
diately after completion of each agenda item). The research showed that greater 
interaction and evenness of participation were associated with more strategic and 
less operational boards; such meetings were characterised by greater challenge 
to management and the emergence of new ideas. Conversely, where insufficient 
time was accorded to agenda items, and where there was imbalance in partici-
pation, meetings tended to become ‘information sessions’ to which NEDs were 
less able to contribute. However interaction, as measured by turn-taking, dura-
tion of turns, and director participation/silence, not only varied between the two 
boards observed but within boards across agenda items, indicating the complex 
dynamics of board meetings which challenges the rather simplistic assumptions 
of theory.
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A study which goes beyond the positivist ideas underpinning much observational 
research is provided by Maitlis (2004). Maitlis examined the assumption that man-
agers use information asymmetry to further their own interests at the expense of 
principals through an exploration of the boards of two UK symphony orchestras 
conducted over 2  years. Though Maitlis did not audio record meetings, she took 
field notes ‘that were as near as possible to a literal transcript’ (p. 1281). Instances 
of CEO influencing behaviours were analysed and from this four ‘key influence pro-
cesses’ were defined: exploiting key relationships; managing impressions; managing 
information; and protecting formal authority. These influence processes are inter-
connected and ‘temporally and contextually embedded’, i.e., they build cumulatively 
over time. Maitlis’ work challenges the assumption that the withholding of informa-
tion inevitably leads to the board becoming a ‘passive management tool’, rather, it 
is the way that information is managed and with whom it is shared that is critical in 
building influence,
Influential CEOs are not those who never share what they know (for this could 
leave board members feeling uncomfortably ill-informed), but rather share just 
enough and at just the right times that they maintain their unique position in 
the information network. (Maitlis 2004, p. 1299)
Thus, Maitlis critiques the simplistic view of ‘information’ as a commodity to 
be withheld or exchanged, rather, information is a complex dynamic negotiated by 
members. Maitlis’ work also supports Brennan et al.’s (2016) contention that infor-
mation asymmetry concerns not only what is shared/withheld but also its quality. 
Managers’ knowledge is often ‘dirty’ and ambiguous, based on direct experience, 
whereas board knowledge is founded on largely formal and second hand informa-
tion. Moreover, asymmetry may also exist in relation to expertise and understanding 
of information presented to the board, which has clear implications for board devel-
opment and recruitment.
5.1  The ‘control‑collaboration paradox’
Following Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) a number of studies have examined 
agency and stewardship and the ‘control-collaboration paradox’ that arises in the 
contest between them. Nicholson et  al. (2017) examine the claim that governance 
failure arises from NEDs’ inability to hold executives to account. The analysis 
adopted an inductive approach in which boardroom behaviours were identified and 
coded as supportive or accountability behaviours, and from which a model of board-
room accountability routines was developed. The findings of the research challenge 
the presumed patterns of accountability in ‘traditional’ agency theory, whereby 
managers provide an account of activities to the board, are questioned by NEDs, and 
then respond. Instead, the researchers uncovered a pattern in which accountability 
was distributed across the board. Insider/outsider status became blurred as NEDs 
took up and laid down particular roles, for example, being delegated responsibil-
ity for specific tasks such as committee work. This blurring of accountabilities was 
also found by Saj (2013) in a case study including observation of the board of a 
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‘large charity’ in Australia, conducted over a complete annual cycle, examining how 
governance is ‘co-produced’ by board members and executives. Saj found consider-
able overlap in roles between board and management, leading to a relationship of 
interdependency consistent with stewardship theory. Parker (2007) also notes that 
the insider/outsider status of board members was on occasion blurred, as NEDs led 
discussions around areas of expertise or committee responsibilities, a finding that 
problematises the rather simplistic assumptions underpinning agency theory.
Smith and Lewis (2011) suggest that boards manage the control-collaboration 
paradox in a number of ways. They may separate the poles of the paradox either 
temporally or spatially, or they may embrace the ambiguity. The work cited above 
indicates that boards are able to manage, and even exploit, the paradoxical elements 
through complex processes of spatial/temporal separation; indeed, this may be a 
commonplace. Michaud (2014) investigated these relationships in a socio-material 
study of a not-for-profit cooperative in Canada over a 10-year period. In doing this 
she explored the role of numbers and other ‘calculable spaces’ as mediating objects, 
that is, objects that enter into and structure interactions within a group, especially as 
carriers of ‘controversy, compromise or prescription’. Numbers occupy a privileged 
place in the work of governing boards, drawn on both to structure interaction and 
exercise control. Michaud demonstrated that, over time, and at different stages in the 
organisation’s evolution, numbers were drawn on to mediate the paradoxical relation 
between control and collaboration in different ways. Michaud divides her observa-
tion period into five phases: from a developmental phase with numbers associated 
with aspirations and goal-setting in the co-operative (collaboration); through phases 
2 and 3 characterised by a growing crisis around the performance of the manager in 
which numbers were used to hold to account (control); to a period of repair in which 
numbers were drawn on to ‘reassure and pacify’; and a final period characterised by 
a ‘control-collaboration duality’ in which manager and board mobilised numbers in 
different ways to justify actions and challenge respectively. Michaud concludes that 
numbers ‘modulated the distance between board and management [allowing] for the 
control-collaboration paradox of governance to be embraced’ (Michaud 2014, p. 
97).
5.2  The role of the symbolic
While the strategy role is assumed by analysts and members alike to be a key func-
tion of the governing board, a small number of studies have disputed the primacy of 
this, instead drawing attention to the symbolic role. Hough et al. (2010) observed 
five boards of ‘micro and small not-for-profit organisations’ operating in the health 
sector in Australia over a period of 12–14  months. Hough et  al. extend Hendry 
et al.’s (2010) typology of strategising as procedural or interactive, adding a third 
category which they refer to as symbolic. In this scenario, the board engages in plan-
ning and produces a strategy, but it is the process of planning that is key, whether or 
not the plan is subsequently implemented. Strategising is thus a practice drawn on 
by the board by means of which it constitutes itself as a board.
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Work by Freeman, Peck et al. (2004; Freeman and Peck 2007) also considers the 
symbolic nature of governance. They undertook observation of a NHS Board charged 
with developing strategy around commissioning and provision of health care services. 
Peck et  al. (2004, pp. 105–106) argue that ritual performed a number of functions: 
‘sustaining social solidarity between elites’; as a ‘method of institutionalising codes of 
speech’; creating consistent patterns of response; and overall as creating ‘organisational 
settlement’, i.e., in constituting the organisation as the kind it was. However, there was 
interplay between the symbolic and the instrumental aspects. Freeman and Peck (2007) 
concluded ‘in the midst of the instrumental there is theatre and the performance may 
yield instrumental results—indeed, the symbolic may provide the means and language 
by which instrumental work is enacted’ (p. 923). As March and Olsen (1983, p. 742) 
observe, ‘rituals seek to establish … not only the virtue of events but also their neces-
sity.’ These findings are relevant to neo-institutionalist theory which challenges the pri-
ority of instrumentalism over symbolism.
Schwartzman (1989) too questions the ‘cultural premise’ that the purpose of 
board meetings is to engage in strategic decision-making. Like March and Olsen 
(1975), she regards decision-making as ‘a post-factum construct’. Schwartzman 
undertook an ethnographic study of a health centre in the US, tracing events sur-
rounding the appointment of a new director following a period of turbulence con-
cerning the outgoing director. There were two candidates for the post: one inter-
nal, the other external. Schwartzman observed the board meeting at which the new 
appointment was made. Although participants at the meeting in retrospect spoke of 
this decision as a foregone conclusion, this was not apparent from Schwartzman’s 
field notes as the meeting unfolded. In fact, the successful (internal) candidate was 
not widely popular and was not supported by all board members. However, this can-
didate was known to the board while the other had nothing but himself to recom-
mend him,
Talking about [the outsider candidate] invoked abstract concepts (leadership 
skills, ideals about staff delegation of authority), but although these might pro-
duce a discussion about an ideal person or an ideal organization, they could 
never produce ‘the organization’. (Schwartzman 1989, p. 238)
Schwartzman argues that the situation concerning the outgoing director caused an 
existential crisis over several months during which time the identity of the board had 
become fractured. Discussion around the internal candidate enabled the board to re-
constitute itself in relation to the organisation, while the other candidate did not. In 
a neat ironic reversal, Schwartzman concludes that, rather than the purpose of meet-
ings being to make decisions, the opposite is true—‘decisions make meetings, and 
meetings make, remake, and sometimes unmake the organization’ (p. 239).
6  ‘Good’ versus ‘effective’ governing
While theoretical models attempt to provide explanations which account for govern-
ing, one of the reasons for carrying out research on governing is to establish what 
is ‘effective’ (however defined). A related question concerns the extent to which 
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‘good’ governance, as conceived in a range of prescriptive codes, is informed by this 
research and hence the relationship between good and effective governing.
6.1  Good governance
In recent years, codes of governance have become ubiquitous in both for- and non-
profit organisations, with global convergence evident (Jørgensen and Sørensen 
2012). Most have some legal force and adopt a policy of ‘comply or explain’ (e.g., 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, nd; Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) 2018; Association of Colleges 2015; Sport England nd). An exception is the 
UK charity governance code (Charity Governance Code Steering Group, nd) which 
is not legally binding and adopts the principle ‘apply or explain’. Although codes 
may differ in detail, they generally comprise: the role of the board, its responsibili-
ties and legal duties; board procedures; accountability (including the need for vari-
ous committees, principally around audit and remuneration); and board evaluation. 
As noted earlier, codes also set out the board’s corporate and social responsibilities. 
In addition, many of the codes covering not-for-profit organisations in the UK refer 
explicitly to the Nolan Principles of public life, which apply to all ‘public office 
holders’ (selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and 
leadership) (Gov.uk, nd). It follows from this that ‘good’ governance may be defined 
as forms of governing which comply with the letter and spirit of their respective 
code.
Understandably perhaps, codes of governance conflate good and effective govern-
ance. This is challenged, however, by research findings which demonstrate diver-
gence and a tendency towards the emergence of unanticipated consequences (Mer-
ton 1936). Tacon and Walters (2016) observed the governing board of a UK-based 
national sports body funded by Sport England over a period of 1 year. Observations 
revealed that the board explicitly oriented to its code of governance, ‘at times, board 
members directly invoked … the text of particular governance guides, when con-
structing and enacting their board roles’ (p. 376). In particular, they adopted a ‘pro-
fessional logic’ which understood the role of the board in strategic decision-making 
within an overall discourse of ‘modernisation’. However, although there was much 
‘governance talk’, around which a clear consensus emerged, there was little evidence 
that this led to more effective practices. In fact, the authors point to an ‘ongoing con-
flict’ which circulated around the fundamental question of the board’s representative 
role, i.e., the constitution of the board in relation to its stakeholders. Walters and 
Tacon (2018) conclude that the code constrained the autonomy of the board, pre-
venting them from taking measures that they believed would enhance organisational 
effectiveness.
Similarly, Young (2016), in a study of four school governing boards, observed 
how governors enacted ‘prescribed criticality’ through guidance provided by Ofsted 
(UK Office for Standards in Education) on the ‘right’ kinds of questions to ask. This, 
Young argues, gave rise to a ‘neoliberal rationality of effectiveness’ (p. 172) and she 
concludes, ‘Governors are encouraged to keep busy asking prescribed questions, but 
are passive in considering what conception of “good” education lies behind these 
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questions’ (p. 173). In this way, in an ironic reversal passivity is enacted as par-
ticipation. While this might be ‘good’ governance, its relationship to effectiveness is 
less clear.
This was also the conclusion reached by Freeman et al. (2016) in their investiga-
tion of governing practices in four NHS Foundation Trust boards in England. The 
study focused on strategic developments in relation to infection control data and 
patient safety. The authors undertook a comparative case study across four represent-
ative sites (Freeman et al. 2016). Four board meetings were observed in each loca-
tion. Adopting a Goffmanesque dramaturgical approach, Freeman et  al. examined 
the work of the board along four dimensions: scripting (how participants are posi-
tioned through the activity); setting (physical environment and artefacts employed); 
staging (how interaction is deliberately organised by participants); and performance 
(how contextualised interactions construct the social realities at hand). Unlike cod-
ing, this analysis preserves the integrity of the data. A range of patterns of activ-
ity was identified, each encompassing different practices, which were stable over 
the period of observation. These practices used infection control data to construct 
social realities in different ways. At only one site did practices of governing align the 
use of this data with ‘improvement processes’ to develop strategy aimed at driving 
performance around infection control. At the other three sites, governing practices 
produced different social realities, including: apportioning blame; the reclassifica-
tion of targets under a risk management traffic lights system from ‘amber’ (requiring 
external scrutiny) to green (no external involvement necessary); and dismissal of 
targets as ‘unrealistic’. Crucially, while the work of all boards was held to accord 
with ‘international norms’, the extent to which these led to improvement was ques-
tionable. The authors concluded that ‘governance activities remain contingent on 
board dynamics’ (p. 247).
6.2  Effective governance
Effectiveness in codes of governance is defined in relation to the tasks demanded 
of the board and the responsibilities of key participants in this. Guidance on board 
effectiveness (FRC 2018), for example, explicitly recognises the importance of pro-
cedural, cultural and inter/personal factors underpinning effectiveness. The chair is 
held to play a particularly important role including facilitating the meeting, foster-
ing relationships, enabling open communication, and setting the boardroom culture, 
consequently, a good deal of board effectiveness research focuses on the chair and 
chair behaviour.
Leblanc (2003) studied boards of 39 companies over 5 years, including attendance 
at board/committee meetings at 21 of these sites (Leblanc 2003, p. 78). His work high-
lights the importance of board member behaviour in relation to key tasks from which 
he developed a typology of ‘effective’ and ‘dysfunctional’ boards based on 10 ‘director 
types’, conveniently all starting with the letter C. The five effective types were: Change 
Agents, Consensus-Builders, Counsellors, Challengers and Conductors; and the five 
dysfunctional types: Controllers, Conformists, Cheerleaders, Critics and Caretakers. 
Leblanc concluded that board process and the ‘behavioural characteristics of individual 
 C. Watson et al.
1 3
directors’ was crucial, certainly more important than board structure or director com-
petence. Within his typology the role of the chair was held to be pivotal. Leblanc char-
acterised effective boards as being chaired by ‘Conductors’ (work towards consensus, 
manage dissent, act as a ‘hub’) and dysfunctional boards by ‘Caretakers’ (‘under-con-
trolling’, lacking leadership).
Bezemer et al. (2018), also who examined the role of the chair in a study of three 
not-for-profit boards described as ‘member-based corporations’. Analysis produced 
three main chair ‘behaviours’: giving personal views; facilitating; and providing infor-
mation. In all three boards, facilitating was the main activity, and providing informa-
tion the least. Across the boards, wide variation was seen in the amount of time the 
chair spent talking and this was negatively correlated with director satisfaction with 
chair performance. Overall, NED engagement was lower when the chair was highly 
involved. The authors concluded that ‘a heavily involved chair undermines the agency 
of the other directors’ (p. 226). This is also noted by Pugliese et al. (2015a), who write, 
‘A board that requires a chair to actively participate may be exhibiting signs of dysfunc-
tion rather than effective chairing’ (p. 37). This was particularly evident in one of the 
boards investigated, ‘where the chair was undertaking textbook facilitation behaviours 
(focusing discussion, keeping the meeting moving and so on) that were viewed by the 
directors as inhibiting the discussion and effective task execution’ (p. 37). A similar 
concern was noted by James et al. (2012) in their study of school boards.
Parker’s (2007, 2008) participant observation of the boards of two Australian not-
for-profit organisations also examined facilitation of meetings by the chair. In both 
boards he observed an informal style which ‘appears to enable both transparency of 
exchanges and critique, defuse confrontation and stress, and simultaneously maintain 
cohesion among directors even at points of intense debate or disagreement’ (p. 932). 
However, while acknowledging the use of informality and humour to facilitate direc-
tor engagement in meetings, he also noted that these ‘[sometimes] appeared to restrain 
directors from aggressively pursuing or critiquing issues’ (p. 929). This, points to a 
tension between fostering relationship and ensuring open communication not acknowl-
edged in normative codes. These findings indicate the potential of empirical research 
to add to knowledge around the contradictions and tensions of the work of boards and 
to illuminate the ways in which codes of governance serve as disciplinary mechanisms 
which serve to interpellate boards into dominant discourses.
However, despite attempts by codes of governance to render synonymous good 
and effective governing, there is an obvious temporal disjunct between them. Out-
comes of board meetings may be related to the management and orchestration of 
board dynamics by the chair, but effective governing (unlike good governing), is 
another ‘post-factum construct’ (March and Olsen 1975), narratively assembled 
after the event.
7  Observational research and claims to process
Many of the papers examined in this review equate observation with a process 
approach (Parker 2007, 2008; Hough et al. 2010; Maitlis 2004; Pugliese et al. 2015a, 
b; Tacon and Walters 2016; Nicholson et al. 2017;Bezemer et al. 2018). However, as 
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Jarzabkowski et al. (2017) point out, there is a weak and strong use of this term. In 
weak process research, the aim is ‘to understand the temporal evolution of things 
or substances that nevertheless retain their own identity over time’ (Langley and 
Tsoukas 2017, p. 3). Thus, processes are forces of change that push substances 
around, effectively giving primacy to substance over process (Rescher 1996). Strong 
process approaches, by contrast, draw on process metaphysics, which entails an 
‘ontological commitment that views the world as constantly becoming’ (Langley 
and Tsoukas 2017, p. 4). Bergson (1913) set out the challenges of adopting such a 
commitment. For Bergson, experience is bound up with the continuous flow of time 
as durée. ‘Conceptualising thought’ is incapable of adequately grasping this flow 
and instead attempts to capture and stabilise it as things (including time itself). In 
other words, we have a tendency to reify as ‘things’ ongoing processes, abstracting 
these from the continuous flow of time. Adopting a commitment to a process ontol-
ogy entails seeing organisation in a constant state of flux in which process produces 
substance. This requires a radically different approach to research and explains why 
a strong process approach to research on governing boards is much scarcer than its 
weaker variant. Indeed, of the research presented above which claim to be ‘proces-
sual’, the vast majority is ‘weak’ process research. Arguably, any research which 
employs coding to abstract and reduce data to identifiable categories can be said 
to fall into the weak category. Strong process approaches, by contrast, look for pat-
terns of activity exhibiting repetition and difference (Deleuze 1994). Hence ‘situated 
action’ is a key feature of processual research (Jarzabkowski et al. 2017, p. 238).
Pettigrew (1997, p. 140) outlines a set of criteria by which process research may 
be judged. These relate to: embeddedness (the contexts which both produce and 
are produced by the social phenomenon under study); temporal interconnectedness 
(understanding the flow of events over time); attention to the ways in which context 
shapes actions; a search for holistic explanations; and having the ‘ambition’ to link 
process to outcomes, while recognising that this outcome is not an end point but is 
itself caught up in the ebb and flow of process.
This is an exacting list of requirements and, while probably none of the work 
cited in this paper can lay claim to all, some contain features of it. Freeman et al. 
(2016) and Michaud (2014), for example, certainly do (though interestingly neither 
lays claim to be being processual): Freeman et al. clearly maintain the holistic integ-
rity of explanations within and between cases; Michaud attends to temporal inter-
connectedness and the ways in which actors both shape and are constrained within 
contexts. Of the research so far presented, however, Schwartzman’s (1989) analy-
sis perhaps comes closest to embracing a commitment to the ontology of process, 
showing how the organisation is immanent in the emergent and contingent processes 
of ‘decision-making’.
Another example which deserves consideration is Samra-Fredericks’ (2000a, 
b) study of governing in a UK manufacturing company. Samra-Fredericks 
video/audio recorded teams of directors and senior managers over a series of 
monthly meetings in order to uncover the ‘tacit knowledge and skills deployed 
to influence boardroom process’ (2000a, p. 246; original emphasis). In addi-
tion to observation of board meetings, a range of ethnographic data were also 
gathered which served to contextualise the analysis. In each of the papers, 
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Samra-Fredericks presents a small fragment of data capturing the apparently 
mundane, but actually ‘dazzling’ linguistic competence displayed by partici-
pants as they enacted influence, leadership, authority, etc. Samra-Fredericks 
(2000a) focuses on the use of personal pronouns (I, we, our) and how these are 
used by members to draw on their own power bases and sources of authority to 
exercise influence. In 2000(b), she considers the use of ‘well’ and ‘but’ as con-
versational markers used to indicate areas of potential disagreement and extends 
the analysis to show how, at the micro-level of communicative exchange, nego-
tiation is effected and influence enacted. Overall, Samra-Fredericks argues, the 
analysis builds up in layers to reveal ‘aspects of real time strategic story-telling’ 
(2000b, p. 323; original emphasis). Although Samra-Fredericks does not refer to 
her work as ‘processual’, it is clear from her analysis that the ontological com-
mitment is to the immanence of strategic decision-making within the flow of 
interaction. Samra-Fredericks (2000b, pp. 323–324) concludes,
Whilst some may suggest that the ‘Is’ and ‘wells’ of talk take us into the 
realm of trivia, what we cannot disregard is that which we strategically 
and pragmatically do through deploying these basic linguistic resources. 
Indeed, only through such micro-analysis can we really understand and 
appreciate the eventual construction of the spectacular, that is board pro-
cess and the setting of strategic direction and other ‘outputs’ as stated in 
the ‘boards standards model.
Schwartzman and Samra-Fredericks undertake very different forms of analy-
sis—Samra-Fredericks focusing on the minutiae of linguistic production and its 
sequential and layered production in real-time; Schwartzman adopting a tradi-
tional ethnographic approach, working from field notes and retrospective inter-
views. However, in both, time is made to count as the medium through which 
process is effected. In other words, it is clear from both that it is through process 
that the substance of the organisation is created.
8  Discussion: an agenda for research
While research has yielded some insightful accounts, the field is not well devel-
oped and arguably has not (yet) delivered on the promise to open the ‘black box’ 
of governing. As Machold and Farquhar (2013) eloquently put it, ‘the lid of 
the black box has been lifted but there remain many dark corners’. With a few 
notable exceptions, most of the work in this area has been interpreted within an 
objectivist conception of the board, arguably influenced by the norms of govern-
ance organised around competing positivist theoretical conceptions, which fail 
to acknowledge the multiplicity of the phenomena being observed (Crow and 
Lockhart, 2015). Very little has been conducted within constructivist, let alone 
‘post’ paradigmatic conceptualisations. In this final section we briefly suggest an 
agenda which builds on this existing body of work and takes the field forward.
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8.1  Theories of governing
Observational research does not offer unqualified support for any of the main the-
ories of governing. Overall, research tends to confirm the view that most board 
meeting time is spent in receiving information and offering up mild challenge 
(Peck 1995; Peck et al. 2004; Parker 2007). However, taken together, the research 
offers a nuanced view of this and provides some insight into the conditions 
which promote an active role (Pugliese et al. 2015a, b). Moreover, research car-
ried out over an extended period provides insights into the developmental nature 
of boards. In this regard, Brannen et  al. (1976), Ashburner et  al. (1996), Huse 
(1998) and Michaud (2014) all show how patterns of interaction may change over 
time, depending on context and the evolutionary stage of the board. Such findings 
point to the importance of attending to the relational dynamics and entanglements 
between actors in the governing process (Huse et al. 2005) and the need to attend 
to board learning, drawing on recent research around professional learning and 
practice (e.g. Fenwick et al. 2012; Nicolini 2016).
Surprisingly, the contest between agency and stewardship and the apparent 
paradox that surrounds control/collaboration does not emerge as a major issue 
for boards. Michaud (2014) found boards able to navigate control and collabora-
tion through the use of numbers as mediating objects; while both Nicholson et al. 
(2017) and Saj (2013) found that accountabilities tend to be distributed across the 
board, suggesting that the ‘paradox’ is more theoretical than found in practice. 
This suggests that research around committees and how they support the work of 
the main board could add significantly to knowledge of board function.
The role of information asymmetry as a tool by which managers control boards 
is problematised by observational research which reveals it to be a more subtle 
and interactive process than agency theory assumes. As Maitlis (2004) shows, 
the view in agency theory of information as a commodity to be exchanged is sim-
plistic. Rather, ‘information’ forms part of an elaborate repertoire, used subtly 
to bring about influence. Disjuncts between manager and board knowledge is 
an area that warrants further attention. Linguistic analyses, enabled by securing 
video access to boardrooms, would provide useful insights.
While a focus on strategy in organisational studies has flourished in recent 
years with the growth of the strategy-as-practice turn (Whittington 1996; Jarzab-
kowski 2004), very little of this has informed the research on governing boards. 
In particular, very few empirical studies examine how boards ‘do’ strategy, nor 
about how this aspect of the role is entangled with other key functions of the 
board and hence how this ‘produces’ organisation. In addition, little has been 
said about value added by boards in doing strategy. Indeed, Judge and Talaulicar 
(2017) raise the interesting question, whether boards may be too involved thereby 
undermining the authority of management. In sum, the passive/active binary 
opposing agency and stewardship has been unhelpful in obscuring the complexity 
of processes of strategising. Approaches which explore ways in which govern-
ance is communicatively constituted through the processes and practices of the 
governing board and associated activities would extend the field (Cooren et  al. 
2011) as would research which considers the materialities of embedded practices 
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as constitutive of everyday organising (Fenwick 2016; Balogun et al. 2014; Jar-
zabkowski et al. 2015).
Finally, we may note that very little appears to be said about resource depend-
ency theory in the literature. However, the ways in which expertise is drawn on in 
the boardroom, the reputational capital accruing from board membership, and the 
networks to which the board provides access, are clearly areas that warrant detailed 
examination.
8.2  Good and effective governing
While there is a tendency to conflate good and effective governance, these are 
clearly distinct: good governance may be defined as compliance with a normative 
code; effectiveness must be assessed in relation to the performance of the organisa-
tion (however defined), hence necessarily post hoc. The difference between the two 
was clearly evident in studies reported here. Walters and Tacon (2018) argue that 
explicit orientation to a code prevented the board from taking measures that would 
enhance organisational effectiveness; Young’s (2016) research participants worked 
within a very prescriptive code, the effect of which was to deflect board members 
from a consideration of the wider aims and purposes of the organisation; while 
in Freeman et  al.’s (2016) study compliance with international norms resulted in 
very different outcomes, only one of which might reasonably be expected to benefit 
patients. Similarly, Bezemer et al.’s (2018) study of board chairs produced findings 
that challenge received opinion regarding the actions of the chair in facilitating good 
governance, suggesting that ‘text book’ facilitation behaviours may inhibit active 
participation of board members. These findings point to the importance of irony as a 
means to gain insight into governance failure (Watson 2019).
If ‘good’ governance can be defined as compliance with a respective code, effec-
tive governance is more problematic—effective in relation to what? If the answer 
to this is the realisation of the organisation’s aims, this still leaves unclear how this 
is to be done: is it through its instrumental actions—its scrutiny and challenge, its 
active role in shaping strategy? Or is it about the symbolic and the ‘kind’ of organi-
sation constructed through enactments of governing? Research has very little to say 
about this. As Crow et al. (2016, p. 1026) assert, ‘no explanations of how and why 
improved performance occurs as a result of active boards have been provided to 
date’.
8.3  Processual methodology
The third theme examined claims concerning the processual nature of research on 
governing boards. Here we find evidence of Jarzabkowski et  al.’s (2017) divide 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ approaches with different ontological commitments. 
While both offer insights of use to the field, both have limitations. Weak approaches 
collapse time: actions are abstracted and classified to produce events that are 
termed ‘governing’. In ‘weak’ process research, the analyst adopts uncritically the 
members’ reification of processes as ‘things’, thereby committing the ‘fallacy of 
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misplaced concreteness’ (Whitehead 1929). The task for the researcher adopting a 
strong approach is to understand the processes by which this reification, as member 
perceived enactments of governing, occurs. However, there is the danger that strong 
approaches which focus on micro-level practices (decision-making, use of linguis-
tic markers etc.) do not address the uniqueness of governing which make it differ-
ent from other aspects of organisation. This suggests a need to develop approaches 
which focus on board level activities in order to capture governing as immanent.
9  Conclusion
In relation to theories of governing and principal-agent relationships, it is clear that 
these offer only partial explanations. None is able to offer an account which ade-
quately recognises the complexity of the processes and practices involved. Arguably, 
the ‘paradoxes’ that have emerged (on paper) owe more to the differing paradig-
matic frameworks of these theories than to any ‘objective’ reality. For this reason, 
sociological analyses are required which bring the lens of social theory to bear on 
governing as a complex social phenomenon. In particular, sociomaterial approaches 
would shed light on enactments and practices of governing and the assemblages and 
networks that constitute governing within the boardroom and beyond.
Approaches which look for ‘good’ and ‘effective’ governing are similarly chal-
lenged. Rarely are the assumptions which underpin these discursively orchestrated 
constructs examined. Rather, analysts tend to adopt uncritically members’ construc-
tions of these norms, hence a focus on ‘core’ activities such as strategy, support/
service, and control. There is therefore a need to better understand the contexts 
and constraints within which governing is enacted and the discourses within which 
‘good’ and ‘effective’ governance are constructed.
Finally, while ‘strong’ process approaches may be more attuned to the emergence 
of governing, such approaches need to found their commitment to an ontology of 
process more robustly (Hodges 2008). Moreover, bringing process approaches to 
the study of boards has to be attuned to the level of the board as the unit of analy-
sis in order to foreground the uniqueness of governing as that which constitutes the 
organisation.
Taken together, such approaches may yield a body of knowledge that addresses 
the question of how the board enables the organisation to realise its aims (if indeed 
it does).
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